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Auditor-provided Tax Services and Clients’ Tax Avoidance: 
Do Auditors Draw a Line in the Sand for Tax Advisory Services? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates U.S. audit firms’ compliance with the prohibition on the supply of tax-
aggressive strategies to their audit clients. Incidences of audit failures and tax aggressiveness 
linked to non-audit services, along with the resurgence of advisory services as the main revenue 
source, have called into question audit firms’ compliance with existing regulations. Using 
quantile regressions, we observe an upper bound in the positive association between auditor-
provided tax services (APTS) and tax avoidance documented in prior studies. We interpret the 
existence of an upper bound as evidence of audit firms’ compliance. Interestingly, we observe 
that the association turns negative for high tax avoidance clients. This non-linearity suggest audit 
firms also take steps to reduce their level of exposure to tax-aggressive clients. While our main 
results suggest compliance, trend analyses shows an increase in the level of tax avoidance 
associated with APTS during our sample period. We also find a more persistent association for 
larger clients, suggesting economic bonding influences the level of tax aggressiveness an audit 
firms’ is willing to provide. These findings should be informative to regulators on compliance 
with existing regulations.   
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Auditor Tax Advisory Services and Clients’ Tax Avoidance: 
Do Auditors Draw a Line in the Sand for Tax Advisory Services? 
1. Introduction 
There are renewed concerns among audit regulators about the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS), in particular tax services, to audit clients. This is evident by the Financial 
Reporting Council (the audit regulatory body in the U.K.) suggesting that accounting firms 
should restrict their services to audit-only functions (Marriage 2018). Also, the European Union 
(E.U.) placed new restrictions on permitted NAS and a cap on the amount of non-audit services 
that can be provided to audit clients as a response to the audit failures during the global financial 
crisis (European Council Directive 2014/56/EU).1 In the United States, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) developed Rule 3522 in 2006 to specifically prohibit 
audit firms from providing “tax aggressive” services to their public-listed clients. 2 Nonetheless, 
the PCAOB has expressed concern about ‘a compliance problem with existing rules’ following 
evidence of tax-aggressive strategies linked to NAS (Harris 2014).3 Finally, recent years has 
witness the resurgence of consultancy fees as the dominant revenue source for audit firms, 
raising concerns about a return to the aggressive marketing days of the 1990s (Rapoport 2018). 
In light of the PCAOB’s concern, coupled with the wider debate on the provisions of non-audit 
services, we investigate whether U.S. audit firms are in compliance with current rules on non-
audit service.  
                                                          
1 Prohibited NAS include provision of tax advisory and compliance services, involvement in management decision-
making, advisory services related to capital or debt financing and structuring, and certain legal services.   
2 Throughout the paper we use the term audit firm to refer to the accounting firms subject to PCAOB regulations and 
clients to refer to the public-listed companies that use the services of the audit firm.  
3 In 2015, the PCAOB launched a review into the “nature of the tax services that auditors are performing for their 
audit clients” following accusations that PwC provided tax-aggressive strategies that allowed Caterpillar to avoid 
$2.4 Billion in taxes (U.S. Audit Regulator Scrutinizing PwC over Caterpillar Tax Advice, WSJ 11/18/2014). The 
PCAOB continues to monitor the effect of tax services on auditor independence (quality) as part of their strategic 
plan (PCAOB 2018). 
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PCAOB Rule 3522 creates an upper bound on the scope of tax planning strategies an 
audit firm can provide to its audit clients. While there is not a bright-line test for tax-
aggressiveness, PCAOB Rule 3522 defines a non-aggressive tax position as one that “is at least 
more likely than not to be allowable under applicable tax laws.” This definition places 
considerable judgment in the hands of the audit firm and their client to decide whether a 
particular tax strategy is aggressive. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that 
the international tax structure adopted by Caterpillar for reporting profits in Switzerland lacked 
economic substance and was abusive of the tax code. However, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Caterpillar’s external auditor and source of the tax strategy) countered that the tax structure 
conforms to all relevant tax laws and is therefore not abusive. Caterpillar is still fighting this IRS 
ruling in courts. Given the ambiguity surrounding tax-aggressiveness, an audit firm may assert 
that its tax strategies are in compliance, until their assertions are tested in the courts or prohibited 
by tax authorities. Furthermore, having a rule in existence does not necessarily translate into 
compliance by participants. For example, an investigation by the U.S. Permanent Subcommittee 
found that a number of audit firms were charging contingent fees in the 1990’s even though Rule 
302 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct specifically prohibited that practice.4 In this 
study, we empirically test for compliance with PCAOB Rule 3522 by identifying the existence of 
an upper bound in the association between auditor-provided tax services and clients’ level of tax 
avoidance. 
Tax avoidance can be viewed as a continuum beginning on one end with benign tax 
strategies, e.g., investment in tax-free bonds, and ending with aggressive tax strategies, e.g., tax 
shelters (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Initially, tax advisors will offer benign tax strategies, i.e., 
                                                          
4 The Permanent Subcommittee (2005) found significant disagreement within audit firms about the precise 
interpretation of what constitutes a contingent fee (Lennox 2016).  
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“low-hanging fruits.” As the clients demand more tax savings, the advisor will begin to offer 
more complex and aggressive tax strategies, advancing along the tax continuum. For audit firms, 
subject to PCAOB Rule 3522, we argue there is a point where the next incremental tax strategy 
is too aggressive, and the firm will forego the additional revenue rather than be in breach.  
Johnstone (2000) develops a model for an audit firm’s decision to accept a new audit 
client. The author tests the model on a group of experienced audit partners. She finds that audit 
partners preferred an avoidance strategy for risky clients rather than compensate for the 
additional risk by charging higher audit fees and/or exerting more audit efforts. We posit that tax 
partners also follow a similar client-engagement process when considering a new tax project. We 
argue that tax partners prefer to forego tax-aggressive projects rather than adjust their fees. 
Klassen et al. (2016) interviewed a panel of tax practitioners who noted they were cognizant of 
the PCAOB rules and structure their tax strategies to be compliant. However, whether the 
majority of tax practitioners are in compliance with these rules is still an empirical question.  
We proxy for the clients’ level of tax avoidance using accrual-based effective tax rate 
(GAAPETR) and cash effective tax rate (CASHETR). Lower values for GAAPETR (CASHETR) 
reflect higher levels of tax avoidance (Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008) and indicate more 
aggressive tax planning (Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 2012). Prior literature documents a 
negative association between auditor-provided tax services (APTS) and the clients’ effective tax 
rates (e.g., Mills et al. 1998).  
Overall, our main findings support the existence of an upper boundary in the relation 
between APTS and clients’ level of tax avoidance. We utilize quantile regressions to identify the 
point where the negative association between APTS and clients’ effective tax rates ceases to 
hold. Our results indicate that the negative association between APTS and GAAPETR 
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(CASHETR) becomes insignificant at the 23rd (55th) percentile, which translates into a GAAPETR 
(CASHETR) of 16.23 percent (23.77 percent). Interestingly, beyond this percentile, we observe a 
positive association between APTS and GAAPETR (CASHETR) for high tax avoidance clients. 
We interpret this change in association between APTS and client’s level of tax avoidance as 
evidence of the audit firms taking actions to reduce their level of tax services to tax-aggressive 
clients. Audit firms may also decide to reduce tax services in an attempt to avoid the perception 
of a lack of independence (Gul, Tsui, and Dhaliwal 2006; Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang 2005). Our 
findings are robust to a number of research design choices, including controlling for other 
determinants of tax avoidance, industry, and time-variant effects, as well as alternative measures 
for APTS.5  
Next, we examine two major areas of concern raised by opponents to the provision of tax 
services. First, as consultancy and advisory services have re-emerged as the primary revenue 
stream for most audit firms (Statista 2019) 6, there are concerns of a return to the aggressive 
marketing days of the 1990s and the “potential for conflicts of interest and loss of focus on 
auditing” (Rapoport 2018). To address this concern, we conduct a trend analysis to examine the 
shift over time in the upper (lower) bound on the association between APTS and tax avoidance 
(effective tax rates). A downward shift in the boundary for effective tax rates would be consistent 
with a decline in compliance since the passage of PCAOB Rule 3522 in 2006. The trend analysis 
shows a monotonic downward shift, suggesting that audit firms have, over time, become more 
                                                          
5 To avoid self-selection bias and maximize sample size, we measure APTS as the total fees paid by the client for all 
tax services. In robust checks, we rerun our analysis on a sub-sample of clients that voluntarily disclose their fees 
paid for tax advisory services, inferences are qualitatively similar.  
6 Fees from audit and assurance services accounted for less than 50% of the total revenue generated by all the Big-4 
and second tier accounting firms in 2018.  
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willing to “push the envelope” on the level of tax-aggressiveness. This decline, coupled with the 
resurgence of consultancy services, should be an area of focus for the PCAOB.  
The other major concern we address is whether audit firm’s compliance with PCAOB 
rule 3522 varies with the level of economic bonding with the client. Opponents argue that NAS 
can create economic bonding between the firm and client, affecting auditor’s judgment and 
independence (DeAngelo 1981; Kinney and Libby 2002). Economic bonding may also result in 
the auditor providing aggressive tax strategies in an effort to retain the client. We adopt prior 
studies and proxy for economic bonding using (i) the ratio of tax fees to audit fees (e.g., Lassila, 
Omer, Shelley and Smith 2010) and (ii) the client size (e.g., DeFond and Zhang 2014). Using the 
ratio of tax fees to audit fees, we fail to find evidence that audit firms are more inclined to 
provide aggressive tax strategies to clients with higher fee ratios (i.e. greater economic bonding). 
However, when we partition by the client’s size, we find that the negative association between 
APTS and effective tax rates is more persistent for larger clients (i.e., the switch from a negative 
to positive association occurs at a lower level of ETR). There are at least two probable 
explanations for this greater persistence. The greater persistence may be an indication of an audit 
firm’s willingness to “push the envelope” by offering more tax aggressive strategies to their 
larger clients in hopes of growing revenue. Conversely, larger clients have more tax planning 
opportunities and can therefore implement more sophisticated tax strategies, resulting in greater 
tax savings. Nonetheless, given the concerns about possible economic bonding, the size of a 
client relative to the audit office is another area of interest for the PCAOB.  
Our study is relevant, timely, and provides several important contributions. First, our 
study provides empirical evidence of an upper bound in auditor provided tax services. When 
instances of tax aggressiveness occurs (e.g., Caterpillar case), a major concern among regulators 
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and other stakeholders is whether such incidents are a signal of a more systemic problem within 
the audit industry. While there is no bright-line test for compliance, we interpret the existence of 
an upper bound as indicative of audit firms’ compliance. Whether the upper bound is at the 
optimal point on the tax avoidance continuum is a normative question that is best addressed by 
regulators, in consultation with other stakeholders.  
Second, we provide empirical evidence of the effects of PCAOB regulations on the 
supply side of the audit industry. Prior studies have primarily focused on how companies 
adjusted their demand for auditor’s services (audit and non-audit) post-SOX and post-PCAOB 
(e.g., Omer, Bedard and Falsetta 2006; Omer and Smith 2010; Maydew and Shackelford 2007), 
but there has been little, if any, empirical evidence on how PCAOB regulations have affected the 
supply side. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence 
that shows that audit firms are willing to forego revenue in order to reduce their exposures with 
tax-aggressive clients. For example, three Big-4 audit firms in the U.K. recently announced their 
decision to stop providing tax services to their client in order to avoid the perception of a lack of 
independence (Jones 2019).7 Reputational and litigation risks have increased in importance, as a 
result of the significant penalties and fines imposed on the audit firms and its partners personally 
in the post-PCAOB era.8 While the decision to engage in auditor-provided tax services is a joint 
function of the client and the audit firm, the positive association between auditor-provided tax 
services and the client’s effective tax rates among the tax-aggressive clients is suggestive of 
actions taken by audit firms.9  
                                                          
7 The U.K. operations of PWC, EY, and KPMG announced they would stop offering consulting services to their 
audit clients in an effort to restore public trust in auditor independence (Jones 2019).  
8 The PCAOB has the authority to investigate and discipline registered public accounting firms and persons 
associated with those firms for noncompliance under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(https://pcaobus.org/enforcement/Pages/default.aspx).  
9 If the clients are choosing not to engage the auditors for tax-aggressive strategies, the expectation would be no 
association between APTS and ETRs for high tax avoidance clients. 
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Third, we contribute to the debate on the cost-benefits of non-audit services. While there 
is a potential risk for economic bonding, non-audit services can provide a positive environment 
for knowledge spillover. Audit firms are able to acquire key insights into a client’s operations, 
which enable auditors to provide higher audit quality, improve client financial performance, and 
provide relevant financial information to users (e.g., Abernathy et al. 2016; Gleason and Mills 
2011; Kinney et al. 2004; De Simone et al. 2015). Prohibiting tax services or restricting 
accounting firms to audit-only functions, as proposed by the U.K.’s Financial Reporting Council, 
may have unintended consequences. Practitioners warn that restricting NAS would make 
auditing complex firms harder, harm talent development within the industry, and increase the 
cost for clients (Dancey 2018). Before placing the additional burden of new regulations on 
clients and practitioners, it would be prudent for authorities to assess if the existing rules are 
effective.  
Finally, we provide empirical evidence of non-linearity in the association between 
auditor-provided tax services and clients’ tax avoidance. Studies that rely on linear regressions 
(e.g., OLS), have the imbedded assumption that the relation is uni-directional throughout the 
distribution of the dependent variable. This assumption can be problematic and result in incorrect 
inferences. Quantile regression relaxes this assumption and allows for non-linearity not only in 
the magnitude but also in the sign of the effect at different points in the distribution. A number of 
contemporary accounting studies explore similar changes in the direction of association along 
within the distribution of the dependent variable (e.g., Hutchens, Rego and Williams 2019; 
Beardsley, Imdieke, and Omer 2018). These studies and ours highlight the importance for 
accounting researchers to consider changes in the association along the distribution of the 
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dependent variable. Such consideration has the potential to resolve some of the mixed evidence 
in the accounting literature.  
2. Background and Prior Literature 
2.1 Institutional Background on the Regulations of Non-Audit Services in the U.S.  
The loss or impairment of an auditor’s independence attributable to the provision of NAS 
to their clients has long been a concern for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
There is some apprehension among regulators that audit firms may become economically bonded 
to their clients (Beck, Frecka, and Solomon 1988). Economic bonding could impair auditor’s 
judgment or result in an environment where audit deficiencies are overlooked in order to 
preserve the auditor/client relationship. To improve transparency, the SEC issued Accounting 
Series Release (ASR) No. 250 in 1978, which required publicly traded companies to disclose 
NAS fees on their proxy statements. The SEC’s intended the disclosure of NAS fees to provide 
investors with some basis to assess the potential impairment of auditor independence. However, 
this requirement was withdrawn in 1981 after it was concluded that investors likely had no 
interest in the disclosure (Glezen and Miller 1985).  
In the late 1990s, the SEC had renewed concerned following significant increases in 
auditor-provided NAS. By 1999, NAS had grown to comprise 51 percent of public accounting 
fees (Byrnes, McNamee, Brady, and Lavelle 2002). In response, the SEC issued in 2000 the 
Revision of the Commissioners’ Auditor Independence Requirements. Under this rule, audit 
firms are banned from providing certain NAS (e.g., bookkeeping, valuation, and actuarial 
services) to their publicly-listed clients. In addition, publicly-listed clients were mandated to 
disclose the total fees paid to their auditors categorized into fees paid for audit services, financial 
information systems design and implementation, and other fees.  
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In the wake of multiple accounting scandals, including WorldCom and Enron, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX granted the SEC new 
enforcement powers, which resulted in the expansion of the number of prohibited NAS. The 
number of prohibited NAS was expanded to include internal audit service, expert services 
unrelated to the audit, and legal representation. In addition, all permitted NAS services has to be 
pre-approved by the client’s audit committee.  
There were significant deliberation by the SEC on whether tax services should be 
included on the list of prohibited NAS. The SEC found that many clients purchased tax shelters 
from their external auditors in the 1990’s. There was concern that these tax aggressive strategies 
could impair auditor independence. However, in their final publication, the SEC concluded: 
The Commission reiterates its long-standing position that an accounting firm can provide 
tax services to its audit clients without impairing the firm's independence. Accordingly, 
accountants may continue to provide tax services such as tax compliance, tax planning, 
and tax advice to audit clients, subject to the normal audit committee pre-approval 
requirements under 2-01(c)(7). (SEC 2003) 
 
As a compromise, the SEC expanded the fee disclosure requirements to include a 
separate category for fees paid for auditor-provided tax services.  
To improve oversight of the audit industry, SOX created the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board. The PCAOB is charged with regulating public accounting firms that provide 
attestation services to SEC registrants. SOX authorizes the PCAOB to establish new 
independence standards and rules, as well as review the audits performed by public accounting 
firms. In 2004, the PCAOB held a roundtable to discuss auditor’s independence in relation to the 
provision of tax services. The PCAOB had concerns that the provision of tax consultancy 
services had the potential to negatively impact auditor’s independence (PCAOB 2004). These 
roundtable discussions led to three new rules to address independence concerns related 
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specifically to tax services. Effective from October 31, 2006, audit firms are prohibited from 
providing the following NAS to their publicly-listed audit clients: i) tax services on a contingent 
fee basis (Rule 3521), ii) tax plans that are tax aggressive or involve confidential transactions 
(Rule 3522), or iii) tax services to executives with financial reporting responsibilities (Rule 
3523).  
2.2 Impact of SOX and PCAOB Regulations on Non-Audit Services 
A number of studies have examined the consequences of SOX and PCAOB’s regulations 
and its impact on the demand for non-audit services. Omer, Bedard, and Falsetta (2006) examine 
the changes in the market for NAS during the legislative debate (2000-2002) by Congress on the 
provisions of SOX and prohibition of NAS. The authors find that during the time of the debate, 
clients with long-term relationships with their auditors were more likely to retain them for tax 
services. Similarly, Lassila, Omer, and Smith (2010) find that during the years immediately 
surrounding the passage of SOX, firms with more complex operations and strong corporate 
governance were more likely to continue to purchase tax-related NAS. Lassila et al. conclude 
that tax-related NAS is fundamentally different from other NAS, and that audit committees do 
not perceive tax-related NAS as an impairment to auditor’s independence. Other studies draw 
similar conclusions (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Cook and Omer 2013).  
The market for tax consultancy services showed considerable shift in demand away from 
the external auditor towards other third-party suppliers. Maydew and Shackelford (2007) find 
that the total amounts paid to external auditors for tax service fees decreased sharply between 
2001 and 2004. However, total tax fees earned by public accounting firms remained consistent 
over the same period. These findings suggest that clients shifted their demand for tax services to 
other third-party accounting firms to avoid any perception of a lack of independence by their 
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external auditor. Lennox (2016) examines changes subsequent to the passage PCAOB 
regulations in 2006. He finds that clients further reduced their purchases of tax-related NAS by 
as much as 60 percent after the adoption of the PCAOB regulations. These studies demonstrate 
that changes in the regulatory environment resulted in a steep shift in clients’ demand for tax 
services away from their external audit and towards other third party accounting firms. However, 
the overall market for tax consultancy services from accounting firms remained unchanged.  
Despite the clients’ efforts to shift tax services away from external auditors, studies on 
market reaction to NAS disclosure suggests that investors still perceive an impairment of auditor 
independence when NAS is high. Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang (2005) find that the ratio of audit 
to non-audit fee as well as and the level of non-audit fees are negatively associated with the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC). However, the negative associated occurred mainly in the 
second and third quarters following the release of the proxy statement. They interpret the 
negative association as investors’ perception that NAS impaired auditor independence. Gul, Tsui, 
and Dhaliwal (2006) find a similar negative market reaction in the Australian market for earnings 
news associated with high NAS. Francis (2006) conducted a review of the extant literature on the 
effects of NAS on audit quality. He concludes that while the extant research suggests NAS may 
create the perception of reduced auditor independence “there is no smoking gun evidence linking 
NAS with audit failures.”  
There is mixed evidence in the tax literature on the association between auditor-provided 
tax services on clients’ level of tax avoidance (tax aggressiveness). Hogan and Noga (2015) find 
that audit clients that purchase APTS have lower long-run effective tax rates than audit clients 
who did not. Likewise, Cook and Omer (2013) find that firms that dismissed their auditors as tax 
service providers subsequently have higher ETRs than those firms that retained their auditors for 
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tax services. Further, McGuire, Omer, and Wang (2012) finds that clients who purchase tax 
services from their auditors had even lower ETRs when the auditor is also a tax expert.10 These 
studies suggest that audit clients who use their auditors for tax services achieve higher levels of 
tax avoidance. In contrast, Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2016) find that companies that use 
their auditor to prepare their tax returns are less tax aggressive (i.e., record lower contingent tax 
liabilties) than those that use in-house staff or a third-party provider. To provide external 
validity, the authors interviewed multiple tax practitioners and found that these individuals were 
cognizant of PCAOB prohibitions on selling tax-aggressive plans to their audit clients. These tax 
practitioners tailor their tax strategies to remain in compliance with PCAOB regulations and/or 
avoid the appearance of a lack of independence. Klassen et al. findings suggest that audit firms 
restrict their scope of tax services to non-aggressive strategies, consistent with the existence of 
an upper bound.  
2.3 Non-Audit Services and Audit Quality  
The effect of NAS on audit quality and the clients’ financial performance is well studied 
in the tax literature. Gleason and Mills (2011) investigate whether tax-related NAS impairs 
auditor independence. To the contrary, they find that tax-related NAS improves estimates for tax 
reserves and does not result in increased misstatements. Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) 
study the separate effects of tax-related NAS and other NAS on audit quality. They conclude that 
clients who purchase tax-related NAS (other NAS) are less (more) likely to have financial 
misstatements. Cook and Omer (2013) also find that the likelihood of financial restatements did 
not change for clients that discontinued procuring tax services from their auditor. De Simone, 
Ege, and Stomberg (2015) examine the impact of tax-related NAS on internal controls and find 
                                                          
10 They measure tax expertise based on the firm’s annual market share in a given industry and metropolitan 
statistical area.  
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that companies that purchase tax-related NAS are significantly less likely to disclose material 
internal control weaknesses. Overall, these studies fail to find evidence that tax-related NAS 
impairs auditor independence. Instead, some of these findings suggest tax-related NAS improves 
audit quality, which they attribute to knowledge spillover from the tax services. Alternatively, 
the findings from these studies can be interpreted as auditors being less likely to demand 
restatements or issue adverse internal control opinions when tax-related NAS is high (Harris and 
Zhou 2013). Therefore, the effect of tax-related NAS on audit quality is not conclusive.  
Other studies that focus on earnings management find that tax-related NAS can lead to 
economic bonding and impair auditor independence. Cook, Huston, and Omer (2008) examine 
the relation between tax-related NAS and earnings management. They find that higher APTS 
fees are associated with a greater reduction in clients’ effective tax rates for third and fourth 
quarter earnings releases. Conversely, clients who did not purchase APTS did not experience a 
similar reduction in their ETRs. The authors view the reduction in ETRs as evidence of increased 
earnings management opportunities for clients that purchased tax-related NAS and opine that 
further regulatory restrictions on tax-related NAS may improve audit quality. 
Lennox (2016) investigates the impact of the passage of the PCAOB regulations 
(specifically Rules 3521, 3522, and 3523 that restricted APTS) on audit quality. The author 
identifies his treatment group as companies that had a significant drop in APTS after the 
introduction of the restrictions. Using accounting and tax-specific misstatements as well as going 
concern opinions as proxies for audit quality, he does not find a significant change in audit 
quality post-implementation. He concludes that the PCAOB restrictions on tax-related NAS did 
not improve audit quality. However, this study does not address whether the absence of an 
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improvement in audit quality stems from a lack of compliance with the PCAOB rules. In our 
study, we specifically look for evidence of compliance.  
While there has been significant research into the effects of SOX and PCAOB regulations 
on the demand for tax services, clients’ level of tax avoidance, and impact on audit quality, based 
on our research, there have been no empirical study on the supply-side effects of PCAOB 
regulations. Audit firms compliance with PCAOB regulations on the prohibition of aggressive 
tax strategies is largely assumed but untested in the extant literature. Our study contributes to this 
literature by specifically testing for audit firms’ compliance with PCAOB’s restrictions on tax 
services. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argues that tax avoidance can be viewed as a continuum 
beginning with benign tax strategies, e.g., investment in tax-free bonds, at one end and 
aggressive tax strategies, e.g., tax shelters, at the other extreme. Tax advisors will first offer their 
clients benign strategies to reduce their taxes, i.e., the “low-hanging fruits”. After these benign 
strategies have been exhausted, tax advisors will have to develop more costly and complex tax 
strategies to achieve higher levels of tax avoidance, each new strategy increasingly more 
aggressive. Consistent with tax aggressiveness increasing along the continuum, Dyreng, Hanlon, 
and Maydew (2019) finds that tax uncertainty, proxied by unrecognized tax benefits, increases 
with tax avoidance.  
In the case of tax advisory services, we argue that there should exist a point where the 
next incremental tax strategy is too aggressive for the audit firm to provide that incremental 
strategy without breaching PCAOB Rule 3522. Klassen et al. (2016) note that tax partners are 
cognizant not to provide tax-aggressive strategies to their audit clients. We consider this point to 
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be an upper boundary, “a line in the sand”, in the scope of tax strategies that audit firms can 
supply to their audit clients.11 If audit firms are in compliance with PCAOB Rule 3522, then 
there should exist an upper boundary in the association. We, therefore, make the following 
prediction: 
H1: There exists an upper boundary in the relation between auditor-provided tax services 
and clients’ tax avoidance.  
Audit firms exercise choice in their acceptance of a new client or performance of 
additional services to their existing clients. However, little is known about the client engagement 
process. Johnstone (2000) develops a model for an audit firm’s client-acceptance decision based 
on an evaluation of client-related risks and the likelihood of future litigation. The author tests the 
model using 137 highly experienced audit partners as participants. She finds that auditors chose 
to avoid risky clients rather than adjust their audit fees or audit effort to adapt to the increased 
risk. We posit that tax partners follow a similar client-engagement review process and prefer to 
forego risky tax engagements rather than adjust their fees to account for the additional risk.  
4. Research Methodology  
4.1 Measures of Tax Avoidance and Auditor-Provided Tax Services  
In our analysis, we use two measures for tax avoidance: the book effective tax rate 
(GAAPETR) and the cash effective tax rates (CASHETR). Prior empirical studies have used a 
wide variety of proxies for tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Blouin 2014), most of 
these proxies focus on specific forms of tax planning, e.g., i) aggressive tax planning 
                                                          
11 PCAOB Rule 3522 only applies to clients registered with SEC, i.e., public-listed audit clients. The upper 
boundary does not result from a limitation on audit firms’ ability to design and implement aggressive tax strategies. 
As noted in a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 2005), many clients purchased tax shelters 
from their external auditors in the 1990’s. Post PCAOB, audit firms are not prohibited from marketing tax-
aggressive strategies to public-listed companies that they do not audit or private companies (whether or not they are 
audit clients).  
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(unrecognized tax benefits and likelihood of tax shelter participation); ii) segmented tax planning 
(permanent/deferred taxes, domestic/foreign ETRs); or iii) discretionary tax planning (DTAX). 
The two measures we select have the advantage of capturing tax avoidance along the full tax 
continuum, which is consistent with our research interest.  
GAAPETR is calculated as total tax expense (TXT) divided by pre-tax book income less 
special items (PI – SPI). Previous studies show that managers and investors focus on GAAPETR 
as the primary measure of performance for firms’ tax strategy (Rego 2003; Graham et al. 2012). 
While GAAPETR reflects the tax savings from permanent tax strategies, it does not capture tax 
savings from deferral or uncertain tax strategies.12 Hence, we use CASHETR to capture tax 
savings from permanent and deferral tax strategies as well as uncertain tax positions (Dyreng et 
al. 2008; Blouin 2014). CASHETR is calculated as cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax 
book income less special items (PI – SPI). Lower values for GAAPETR (CASHETR) reflect 
higher levels of tax avoidance (Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008). Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 
(2012) define a tax-aggressive entity as one that pays an unusually low amount of tax given the 
entity’s industry and size. We adopt their definition and interpret low levels of GAAPETR 
(CASHETR) as indicative of aggressive tax planning.  
To measure auditor-provided tax services (APTS), we follow prior research and use total 
tax fees paid to proxy for tax advisory services (e.g., Lennox 2016; McGuire et al. 2012; Gleason 
and Mills 2012, Mills et al. 1998). Total fees paid are disclosed in clients’ proxy statements and 
10K filings, and are also available in machine-readable format from the Audit Analytics database. 
Klassen et al. (2016) investigate the association between total tax fees paid to the auditor and the 
                                                          
12 Under FIN 48 guidelines, Accounting for Tax Uncertainty, companies should record a tax reserve for tax positions 
that are less likely than not to be sustained under a tax audit, i.e., aggressive tax strategies. Hence, tax savings from 
aggressive tax strategies would not be reflected in GAAPETR, provided companies apply the FIN 48 rules 
appropriately.  
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individual who signs as preparer on the corporate tax return. They find that 81 percent of their 
sampled companies purchased some form of APTS, but only 20 percent had the auditor sign as the 
preparer on their tax return. Their finding suggests that the total tax fees paid are more likely to 
reflect tax advisory services than tax compliance. They conclude that total tax fees paid is an 
acceptable proxy for tax advisory services. Nonetheless, in robust tests, we utilize a sub-sample of 
clients that voluntarily disclose their tax advisory fees (See Section 5.3 for discussion of results). 
4.2 Empirical Model 
To test our hypothesis, we rely on quantile regressions to detect the upper (lower) 
boundary in the association between APTS and clients’ level of tax avoidance (effective tax 
rates). While classical linear regression techniques (e.g., ordinary least squares), summarize the 
average relationship between the regressor(s) and the response variable, quantile regressions 
allow us to exam the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of the 
response variable (Koenker and Hallock 2001). In the cases where interest lies in the regions of 
the conditional distribution, quantile regressions provide a more detailed analysis of the 
association than the classical linear models (Waldmann 2018). In addition, quantile regressions 
are more robust to influential observations and outliers in the response variable (Koenker 2005; 
Leone, Minutti-Meza, Wasley 2019).  
We begin our test of H1 using the following quantile regression:  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                          (1) 
The dependent variable, Tax Avoidance, is represented in equation (1) by one of our two proxies 
(GAAPETR and CASHETR). Our regressor is total tax fees paid by the client in year t. Following 
prior research (e.g., Mills et al. 1998; Hogan and Noga 2015), we take the natural log of APTS 
(LogAPTS) to control for skewness in the distribution of APTS fees. Consistent with prior 
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studies, we expect the upper-section of the distribution for GAAPETR (CASHETR), i.e., low-tax 
avoidance firms, to be negatively associated with LogAPTS (𝛽1 < 0). However, consistent with 
H1, we expect the magnitude of the association to diminish and eventually lose statistical 
significance as the client moves along the tax continuum and passes the threshold of tax 
aggressiveness (𝛽1 = 0). In other words, we expect APTS to be a driver of clients’ tax avoidance 
up to the point where strategies become tax aggressive, beyond that point any further decline in 
ETRs is not the result of APTS.  
We also use a two-step multivariate regression design to control for other determinants of 
tax avoidance that may be correlated with APTS. We first regress our measures of tax avoidance 
(GAAPETR and CASHETR) on other known determinants that prior studies have shown to be 
correlated with APTS (e.g., Mills et al. 1998; Rego 2003; Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012). 
Second, we insert the estimated residuals (?̂?𝑖𝑡) from the first regression as our dependent 
variable in our quantile regression. This two-step approach allows us to hold the other 
determinants constant while allowing the coefficient on the variable of interest (LogAPTS) to 
vary across the conditional distribution of the response variable.13 The multivariate and quantile 
regressions are represented as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖.𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐹𝐼𝑖.𝑡+ 𝛾3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖.𝑡+𝛾4𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅&𝐷𝑖.𝑡 
+𝛾6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖.𝑡+𝛾7𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖.𝑡+𝛾8𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖.𝑡+𝛾9𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖.𝑡+𝛾10𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖.𝑡 
+𝛾11𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖.𝑡+𝛾12𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖.𝑡+𝛾13𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛾𝐽𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛾𝐾𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡                         (2) 
                                                          
13 In an earlier version of the paper, we divided the sample into quartiles based on the level of tax avoidance and ran 
a single OLS regression, with controls, within each quartile. We found a negative mean effect for the middle two 
quartiles and a positive mean effect for the lowest quartile (high tax avoidance clients), consistent with the results 
from our quantile regressions. We switched to the quantile regression because it allows us to identify the point 
where the direction of association changes.   
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𝛿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                      (3) 
In equation (2), we control for the client’s economies of scale, complexity, opportunities 
and incentives to avoid income taxes and their financial reporting aggressiveness. We control for 
the client’s economies of scale and complexity using firm size (SIZE), income from foreign 
operations (FI), leverage (LEV), capital intensity (PPE), mobile income (proxied by R&D), 
depreciation expenses (DEP), growth opportunities (BTM), and income related to the equity 
method (EQINC). The clients’ opportunities and incentives to avoid income taxes are proxied 
using client’s profitability (PT_ROA), tax-loss carryforwards (NOL), change in NOL (ΔNOL), 
and cash balance (CASH). Next, we control for the clients’ financial reporting aggressiveness, 
using abnormal accruals (ABACC). Frank et al. (2009) finds that companies that are aggressive 
for financial reporting purposes also tend to be tax aggressive. Lastly, we include year and 
industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects and cluster standard errors by clients. Definitions for all 
variables are listed in Appendix A.  
4.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection begins with all observations in the Audit Analytics (AA) database 
for the fiscal years 2002 thru 2016, which is the timeframe attributable to major regulations 
restricting NAS.14 Audit Analytics provide information on the annual fees paid to external 
auditors by all SEC registrants. In refining our sample, we eliminate all non-U.S. companies 
since we are interested in the effect of PCAOB regulations on U.S. businesses. Consistent with 
prior research, we also exclude clients that are registered as mutual funds, trusts, limited 
partnerships, or other flow-through entities, as these business entities have different tax planning 
                                                          
14 We begin the sample period in 2002 because of the restrictions on NAS services that were first introduced in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, followed by the publication of the detailed rules and regulations by the PCAOB in 
2006. Our main results are not sensitive to beginning the sample period in the post PCAOB period (i.e., 2006-2016). 
We will discuss time trends in our cross-sectional analyses (see Section 5.4).  
 20 
opportunities and incentives from C-corporations (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012). We further restrict 
our sample to the original financial statements released by the firms (i.e., RESTATEMENT=0). 
These initial filters result in a sample of 161,419 client-year observations.  
Next, we cross-match our AA sample with available financial statement data obtained 
from the Compustat’s annual database. We eliminate observations that do not have a match or 
the necessary data to calculate our dependent or independent variables in Equations (1) through 
(3). We also exclude client-year observations with negative pre-tax income to ensure that any 
loss of association among low-ETR clients is not driven by loss-making clients that lack demand 
for tax advisory services. Finally, as our focus is on the change in association conditional on 
clients purchasing tax services from their external audit firm, we also exclude client-year 
observations with no tax service fees paid to the external auditor. 15 These requirements result in 
a final sample of 20,423 client-year observations. Table 1 summaries the sample selection 
process.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. The mean (median) amount 
spent for auditor-provided tax services (APTS) is $388,000 ($119,000), which is significantly 
less than the $2.315M ($1.150M) spent for audit services.16 Clients that purchase tax services 
from their auditor have a mean (median) GAAPETR of 28.11 (30.87) percent and a mean 
(median) CASHETR of 23.63 (21.41) percent. The lower values for CASHETR reflect the 
additional tax savings from deferral and uncertain tax positions not captured in GAAPETR. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics are consistent with prior literature (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012).  
                                                          
15 For completeness, in robust test, we include clients that report zero values for APTS and our inferences are 
qualitatively similar. 
16 We include audit fees in Table 2 for comparison purposes, but do not consider it a determinant of tax avoidance in 
Equation (2).  
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Table 3 presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlation matrix in the upper (lower) diagonal 
for the variables in our models. For brevity, we will only discuss the Spearman correlations. 
GAAPETR is negatively correlated with LogAPTS, which suggests that the mean effect of 
purchasing auditor-provided tax services is greater tax avoidance (Mills et al. 1998). However, 
the correlation between CASHETR and LogAPTS is positively and statistically significant.17 The 
correlations between the tax avoidance proxies and the other tax determinants are, in general, 
consistent with prior studies (see Hanlon and Heitzman 2010 for a summary of the determinants 
of tax avoidance). We also observe significant correlations between LogAPTS and a number of 
the determinants. This is not surprising as these determinants are often the vehicles through 
which the audit firms implement their tax strategies (e.g., income-shifting through foreign 
operations (FI), mobile assets (R&D), and debt-financing (LEV)).   
Figure 1 presents scatterplot graphs of the association between APTS and clients’ tax 
avoidance. In Panel A, the scatterplot has GAAPETR on the y-axis and APTS (in millions) on the 
x-axis. The contour of the graph indicates a negative association between GAAPETR and APTS, 
consistent with prior studies. However, the graph indicates that the negative association 
diminishes, eventually becoming asymptotic with the x-axis around the 20 percent GAAPETR 
line. This pattern is be consistent with our expectation from H1 of a lower (upper) bound in the 
association between APTS and effective tax rates (tax avoidance). In Panel B, we mean-adjust 
GAAPETR by industry (based on two-digit SIC) and fiscal year to control for heteroscedasticity 
differences across industries and time (Dyreng et al. 2008; Balakrishnan et al. 2012). The revised 
                                                          
17 In untabulated analysis, we obtain a negative and significant correlation between LogAPTS in year t and 
CASHETR in year t+1. This lagged correlation suggests that while tax savings from APTS are reflected in current 
year earnings, the cash tax savings may not materialize until the following fiscal year when the tax return is filed and 
final payment made (refund obtained). In robustness tests, we rerun our analysis using long-run (3-year) measures 
for LogAPTS and CASHETR (GAPPETR). See discussion of robustness test in Section 5.3. 
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graph continues to show a lower bound in the negative association between APTS and effective 
tax rates. In addition, the lowest quartile of mean-adjusted GAAPETR shows signs of a positive 
association with APTS.18 Overall, Figure 1 provides visual evidence of lower bound, in support 
of H1, and indicates potential non-linearity in the relation between APTS and tax avoidance.  
5. Results 
5.1 Quantile Regressions 
The results of the quantile regression of GAAPETR on LogAPTS from Equation (1) are 
presented in Panel A of Table 4. We tabulate the estimated GAAPETR, coefficients, and 
standard error for the 10th – 90th percentile, in five percentile point increments. We also insert the 
line graph of the coefficients with the 95% confidence interval. The table shows negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for the 90th percentile down to the 25th percentile. A 
breakdown of the 20th – 25th percentile shows that the statistical significance stops at the 23rd 
percentile, which translates into a GAAPETR of 16.23 percent. The loss of statistical significance 
is consistent with H1 – the existence of an upper (lower) bound in the relation between APTS 
and tax avoidance (effective tax rates). Interestingly, we observe positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for the 10th – 18th percentile. The positive coefficients indicate that APTS 
levels are declining for high tax-avoidance clients and suggest any additional tax avoidance is 
attributable to other factors (e.g., third party tax advisors or in-house specialists), not APTS.  
We report the results for the quantile regressions with CASHETR as the dependent 
variable in Panel B of Table 4. We observe a similar non-linear pattern as in Panel A with 
negative (positive) coefficients for LogAPTS for low (high) tax-avoidance clients. The negative 
coefficients loss statistical significance at the 53rd percentile (CASHETR of 23.77 percent) and 
                                                          
18 We construct a similar scatterplots for CASHETR and observe qualitatively similar patterns; for brevity we 
exclude the scatterplots from the paper. 
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the coefficients turn positive and statistically significant at the 45th percentile. The positive 
coefficients suggest audit firms are not only comply with PCAOB Rule 3522 but also reduce 
their tax services to high tax-avoidance clients. Possibly to avoid the perception of being the 
source of these clients’ aggressive tax strategies (Francis 2006; Gul et al. 2006; Krishnan et al. 
2005). Alternatively, it is possible that as the clients become more tax aggressive, they opt for 
third-party providers or in-house tax planners as these sources are not constrained by PCAOB 
Rule 3522 (Klassen et al. 2016). However, if clients are opting to other providers then the levels 
of APTS should hold constant, not reduce, and we should not observe a positive association.  
5.2 Two-Step Multivariate Regressions 
 Next, we repeat our analyses using two-step multivariate regressions to control for other 
known determinants of tax avoidance that may be correlated with LogAPTS (i.e., the omitted 
variable problem). In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we present the results of our estimates of 
Equation (2) with GAAPETR and CASHETR as the dependent variable, respectively In general, 
the coefficients are consistent with prior studies. We find that clients with higher levels of 
foreign income (FI), leverage (LEV), tax losses (NOL), more mobile income (R&D), greater 
complexity (EQINC), and more cash resources (CASH) have lower effective tax rates (i.e., 
higher levels of tax avoidance). In addition, clients that are aggressive for financial reporting 
(ABACC) tend to have higher levels of tax avoidance (Frank et al. 2009). Conversely, larger 
clients (SIZE) are associated with higher effective tax rates (i.e. lower tax avoidance), consistent 
with the political cost hypothesis (Rego 2003). Greater capital intensity (PPE) is associated with 
lower CASHETR, but not GAAPETR, because capital expenditures result in deferred tax savings.  
To compare our setting with prior studies (e.g., Mills et al. 1998), we include LogAPTS as 
a regressor in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. Results show negative coefficients for LogAPTS, 
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which is consistent with prior literature and shows that the mean effect of higher levels of APTS 
is greater tax avoidance.  
Table 6 reports the results of the quantile regressions for Equation (3) with the estimated 
residuals from Equation (2) as the dependent variable. Panel A (Panel B) presents the 
coefficients when the residuals are based on GAAPETR (CASHETR). Consistent with our results 
from Table 4, we continue to observe a non-linear pattern with negative (positive) coefficients 
for LogAPTS for low (high) tax-avoidance clients. Interestingly, after controlling for correlated 
determinants of tax avoidance, we observe little change in the estimated boundary point for 
either specification (21st percentile for GAAPETR and 53rd for CASHETR). Overall, the results in 
Table 6 are consistent with our hypothesis of an upper boundary point in the positive association 
between auditor-provided tax services and tax avoidance.  
5.3 Robustness Tests 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we conduct a number of additional tests. First, 
we use long run (three-year) measures for our dependent and independent variables. Tax 
planning is often complex and involves a number of different steps that take time to implement 
and materialize. Thus, our contemporaneous measures may fail to match the cost of the tax 
strategy (LogAPTS) with the associated benefits (reduction in ETR). If the mismatch between 
cost and benefits is concentrated among the high tax avoidance clients, then this could explain 
the absence of a negative association within this group. To address these concerns, we re-run our 
analyses using long-run (three-year) measures of ETRs (year t thru to t+2).19 For brevity, we do 
                                                          
19 For the long-run test, we use three-year cumulative rolling measures for GAAPETR and CASHETR, following the 
methodology presented in Dyreng et al. (2008). For the regressors, if the variable is a ratio, the three-year measure is 
constructed similar to that for GAAPETR – the sum of the numerator for the years t thru t+2 divided by the sum of 
the denominator for the years t thru t+2. For all other regressors, the three-year measure is a simple rolling average 
for the year t thru t+2. 
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not tabulate our results. Our results are qualitatively similar and continue to show an upper 
bound to the negative association between LogAPTS and ETRs.  
Second, as our main analyses use total tax fees paid as our proxy for tax advisory fees, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that tax compliance fees heavily influence the results. To 
address this identification problem, we utilize a sub-sample of clients that voluntarily 
disaggregate their total tax fees paid into compliance and advisory fees and rerun our test of H1 
on each measure independently. The sub-sample consists of 1,086 client-year observations 
concentrated in fiscal years 2009 to 2016. The results for the quantile regressions are presented 
in Figure 2. Column (1) reports the results for the log of total tax fees paid (LogAPTS), Column 
(2) tax advisory fees, and Column (3) tax compliance fees. All three columns present similar 
findings to those in Table 4 with a negative association that turns positive for high tax avoidance 
clients. These results suggest that audit firms are not only compliant with PCOAB rules on tax-
aggressiveness, but they are also apprehensive about the perception that providing large amounts 
of tax services to high tax avoidance clients can create (Gul et al. 2006; Krishnan et al. 2005).  
5.4 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 To address specific areas of concern raised by opponents of non-audit services, we 
conduct cross-sectional analyses to analyze the validity of their arguments. First, we examine 
whether compliance with PCAOB Rule 3522 has deteriorated over time. Our sample period 
begins in 2002, immediately after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and extends over 
fifteen years. PCAOB Rule 3522 was introduced in 2006, and there has been a number of 
changes in the audit and tax advisory services market with the resurgence of consultancy as the 
major revenue stream for the Big4 and second tier audit firms, accounting for over 50% in 2018 
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(Statista 2019).20 In fact, many of these firms now refer to themselves as professional service 
firms, which reflects the diversification of their service lines. This revival of consultancy 
services has raised concerns of a return to the aggressive marketing days of the 1990s and a 
“potential for conflicts of interest and loss of focus on auditing” (Rapoport 2018; Agnew 2015). 
This shift in revenue sources could diminish the audit partner’s influence in the oversight of the 
client-engagement process for tax services, resulting in weakened compliance with PCAOB Rule 
3522.  
We conduct a trend analysis to examine whether the lower bound in the negative 
association between APTS and client effective tax rates has shifted during our sample period. 
We adopt the partition design from Lennox (2016) and divide our sample into windows spanning 
approximately three-years: i) Pre-PCAOB (Jan 1, 2002—July 26, 2005), ii) Post PCAOB I (Oct 
06, 2006—Dec 31, 2009), iii) Post-PCAOB II (Jan 1, 2010—Dec 31, 2012), and iv) Post 
PCAOB III (Jan 1, 2013—Dec 31, 2016).21 We then run quantile regressions within each 
window. If audit firms are “pushing the envelope” in advising their clients with tax aggressive 
services, then we expect a leftward shift in the lower bound in the negative association between 
APTS and effective tax rates.  
The coefficients from the quantile regressions are presented in the linear graphs in Figure 
3. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results with GAAPETR (CASHETR) as the dependent variable. 
Both panels show a leftward shift in the lower bound of the negative association between 
LogAPTS and effective tax rates. An (untabulated) analysis of the 95% confidence interval for 
                                                          
20 In the wake of the Enron accounting scandal, many accounting firms divested their consulting arms and signed 
non-compete agreements. By the late 2000s, these non-compete agreements had expired (Agnew 2015).  
21 To mitigate misidentification error, Lennox (2016) excludes fiscal years beginning or ending in the “transition” 
window – the period between the announcement of Rule 3522 on July 26, 2005 and its effective date of October 31, 
2006.  
 27 
each window shows that the threshold for Post PCAOB III is significantly lower than the 
threshold for the Pre-PCAOB period. This monotonic leftward shift suggest that, over time, 
auditors are embolden to provide more aggressive strategies to retain their clients and grow 
revenue or to push the envelope to see how far they are able to go within the confines of the 
PCAOB rules. 22 This trend provides empirical evidence for the concerns of a ‘lack of 
compliance’ and a possible return to the aggressive marketing days of the 1990s. 
 Next, we examine whether economic bonding makes audit firms more inclined to provide 
tax-aggressive strategies to their clients. Economic theory suggests that auditors’ incentives to 
compromise their independence are linked to the client importance (DeAngelo 1981). We adopt 
two alternate proxies for economic bonding from prior studies, i) the ratio of tax advisory fees to 
audit fees (BONDING) and ii) client size (SIZE). A number of prior studies use BONDING to 
capture the relative importance of tax fees to audit fees (e.g., Krishnan, Sami, Zhang 2005, 
Lassila et al. 2010). The larger the ratio, the greater the economic bonding and likelihood that the 
audit firm may push the envelope on tax-aggressiveness. Other prior studies argue that it is the 
level of fees or the size of the client, rather than ratio that leads to economic bonding (Carson et 
al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014). The larger the client, the more potential revenue can be 
generated. Since LogAPTS is our variable of interest, we partition on client size rather than the 
level of tax fees paid. 
To facilitate easier interpretation of the results, we split the sample into two groups based 
on whether the client is above or below the median value for BONDING (SIZE) within each 
fiscal year. We then run quantile regressions within each group. The linear graphs of coefficients 
from the results are presented in Figure 4. Panels A (Panel B) of Figure 4 maps the results of the 
                                                          
22 A online search of PCAOB’s annual enforcement orders failed to find any case of an audit firm or partner being 
sanctioned for violating PCAOB Rule 3522 (https://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Pages/default.aspx). 
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quantile regressions with GAAPETR (CASHETR) as the dependent variable and BONDING as 
the partition variable. Both graphs suggest that higher economic bonding is associated with more 
aggressive tax planning (i.e., a shift of the curve to the left). However, an analysis of the 95% 
confidence intervals fails to find significant statistical differences between high BONDING and 
low BONDING clients in both graphs.23  
Panels C and D of Figure 4 maps the results of the quantile regressions with SIZE as the 
partition variable. In Panel C, where GAAPETR is the dependent variable, we observe a lower 
bound for smaller clients at 17.11 percent GAAPETR, similar to the pattern in our main results. 
However for larger clients, there is no evidence of a lower bound as the coefficient is negative 
throughout the distribution of GAAPETR. In Panel D, where CASHETR is the dependent 
variable, we find evidence of a lower bound for both smaller and larger clients, but with a lower 
(and statistically significant, p-value <0.05) threshold for larger clients. Overall, the results in 
Panel C and D suggest the negative association between APTS and effective tax rates is more 
persistent for larger clients. This finding is consistent with audit firms “pushing the envelope” 
and being more aggressiveness with the tax strategies they offer to their larger clients, possibly in 
the hopes of growing revenue, consistent with economic bonding. Alternatively, the greater 
persistence may be the result of larger clients having more tax planning opportunities and ability 
to implement sophisticated tax strategies, leading to greater tax savings. Nonetheless, given 
evidence of possible economic bonding, the size of a client, especially relative to the audit office, 
should be an area of interest for the PCAOB.  
 
                                                          
23 In robustness tests, we measure economic bonding as the ratio of total non-audit fees to audit fees (Krishnan et al. 
2005), and the ratio of other non-audit fees (i.e. total non-audit fees – tax fees) to audit fees (Lassila et al. 2010). We 
do not find significant differences between low BONDING and high BONDING clients using either measure. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate U.S. audit firms compliance with PCAOB Rule 3522. We 
determine compliance by using quartile regressions to identify the upper bound in the association 
between auditor-provided tax services and clients’ level of tax avoidance. While the extant 
literature has studied the consequences of PCAOB regulations, these prior studies make the 
implicit assumption that audit firms are compliant. However, anecdotal incidents of tax 
aggressiveness, as well as the resurgence of consultancy and advisory services as the main 
revenue source for audit firms, have raised concerns of a compliance problem.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find empirical evidence of an upper (a lower) 
boundary in the positive (negative) association between APTS and clients’ tax avoidance 
(effective tax rates). We interpret the presence of an upper bound as evidence of audit firms’ 
compliance with PCAOB 3522. Moreover, we observe a negative association between APTS and 
clients’ tax avoidance for high tax avoidance clients. The positive association suggests audit 
firms take real economic decisions to forego revenue in order to avoid the perception of being 
the source of clients’ tax-aggressive. By reducing their exposure the audit firms their regulatory 
and litigation risks of being accused of facilitating their clients’ aggressive tax behavior.  
Time trend analyses shows an upward shift in the upper bound on the positive association 
between APTS and clients’ tax avoidance in the years following the introduction of PCAOB 
Rule 3522 in 2006. This shift suggests that audit firms are providing more tax aggressive 
strategies to their audit clients, potentially attributable to the resurgence of consultancy and 
advisory services, signaling a return to the aggressive marketing days of the 1990s. In cross-
sectional analyses, we find some evidence of economic bonding. We observe that the upper 
bound is at a higher position for larger clients. This finding suggest that audit firms are willing to 
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“pushing the envelope” for larger clients, possibly to retain clients and grow future revenue. 
Overall, the cross-sectional results suggest that while there is evidence of compliance, audit 
firms are gradually providing more tax-aggressive strategies and are more willing to facilitate tax 
avoidance for larger clients.  
Collectively, the results of our study should be of interest to the PCAOB as it provides 
broad empirical evidence on the effectiveness of current regulations on tax advisory services to 
audit clients. Additionally, the finding of non-linearity between APTS and tax avoidance has 
important implications for future academic research on the external auditor’s role in clients’ tax 
planning strategies. Researchers need to be cognizant that the association between APTS and tax 
avoidance is conditional on whether the client is a high- or low-tax avoider.
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Measures of Tax Avoidance   
GAAPETR Effective tax rate is defined as total tax expense (TXT) divided by pre-tax 
book income less special items (PI - SPI). ETRs with negative denominators 
are deleted. The remaining non-missing ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. 
 
CASHETR Cash effective rate is defined as cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax 
book income less special items (PI - SPI). CASHETRs with negative 
denominators are deleted. The remaining non-missing CASHETRs are 
winsorized at 0 and 1. 
Independent Variables  
ABACC Abnormal accruals based on the performance-adjusted modified Jones Model, 
computed using all available Compustat U.S. companies.  
 
BTM Book-to-market ratio at the end of the year, measured as book value of equity 
(CEQ) divided by market value of equity (PRCC_F x CSHO). 
 
CASH Cash holding at the end of the year (CHE) divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year (AT). 
 
DEP Depreciation and amortization expense for the year (DP) divided by total 
assets at the beginning of the year (AT). 
 
EQINC Equity income (ESUB) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
(AT). 
 
FI Pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year (AT). 
 
LEV Long-term debt at the end of the year (DLTT) scaled by total assets at the end 
of the year (AT). 
 LogAPTS The natural log of (1+ TAX_FEES), in millions. Source: Audit Analytics.  
 
 
LogAuditFees The natural log of (1+ AUDIT_FEES), in millions. Source: Audit Analytics.  
 
 
NOL Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a positive tax-loss carryforward amount 
(TLCF > 0) at the end of the year; 0 otherwise. 
 
∆NOL Change in tax-loss carryforward (TLCF) from year t -1 to t, scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year (AT). 
 
PPE Net property, plant and equipment at the end of the year (PPENT) scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of the year (AT). 
 
PT_ROA Pre-tax return on assets, measured as the ratio of pre-tax income (PI) to total 
assets at the beginning of the year (AT). 
 
R&D Research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year (AT). 
 SIZE Natural log of market value of equity (PRCC_F x CSHO) at the beginning of 
the year. 
Unless otherwise stated, data is sourced from Compustat’s Fundamentals Annual Database.  
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Figure 1 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
The scatterplots above present the association between fees paid for auditor-provided tax services (APTS) and clients’ GAAP 
effective tax rates (GAAPETR). In Panel B, the effective tax rates are mean-adjusted by industry and year to control for 
heteroscedasticity among the observations. Both panels indicate a non-linear pattern in the association between the two variables. 
Note, GAAP ETRs above 1 and below 0 have been truncated. APTS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2 
Quantile Regressions of Tax Avoidance on Fees Paid for Auditor-provided Tax Services  
Total Tax Fees Tax Advisory Fees Tax Compliance Fees 
(Dependent Variable = GAAPETR)   
   
(Dependent Variable = CASHETR)   
 
  
Figure 2 presents graphs from quantile regressions of GAAPETR (CASHETR) on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services, test of H1. The breakdown of tax 
fees is obtained from the Audit Analytics database. Total fees paid for tax services are presented in column (1) , while column (2) and (3) present the results for 
tax advisory and tax compliances fees respectively. The y-axis is the coefficient values from the quantile regressions. The x-axis measures quantile levels of tax 
avoidance, lower values represent higher tax avoidance.  
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Figure 3 
Quantile Regressions of Tax Avoidance on Auditor-provided Tax Services  
Time Trend Analysis  
Panel A: Dependent Variable = GAAPETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = CASHETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the time trend analysis of the association between GAAPETR (CASHETR) and fees paid for 
auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). We adopt the sample partition conducted in Lennox (2016) and partition 
our sample into three-year windows: i) Pre-PCAOB (Jan 1, 2002 thru July 26, 2005), ii) Post PCAOB 1 (Oct 06, 
2006 to Dec 31, 2009), iii) Post-PCAOB 2 (Jan 1, 2010 thru Dec 31, 2012), and iv) Post PCAOB 3 (Jan 1, 2013 thru 
Dec 31, 2016). We then run quantile regressions within each window. The y-axis is the coefficient values from the 
quantile regressions. The x-axis is GAAPETR (CASHETR) in Panel A (Panel B), lower values represent higher tax 
avoidance. 
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Figure 4 
Quantile Regressions of Tax Avoidance on Auditor-provided Tax Services  
Tests for the Effects of Economic Bonding  
Panel A: Dependent Variable = GAAPETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = CASHETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 presents the results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services 
(LogAPTS). In Panels A and B, we partition the sample into lower and higher economic bonding based on the 
median value for BONDING in each fiscal year. The y-axis is the coefficient values from the quantile regressions. 
The x-axis is GAAPETR (CASHETR) in Panel A (Panel B), lower values represent higher tax avoidance. BONDING 
is the ratio of total tax fees to audit fees, higher values represent greater economic bonding. The definitions for 
GAAPETR, CASHETR, and LogAPTS are provided in Appendix A.  
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Figure 4 (continued) 
Quantile Regressions of Tax Avoidance on Auditor-provided Tax Services  
Tests for the Effects of Economic Bonding  
Panel C: Dependent Variable = GAAPETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Dependent Variable = CASHETR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 presents the results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services 
(LogAPTS). In Panels C and D, we partition the sample into lower and higher economic bonding based on the 
median value for client size (SIZE) in each fiscal year. Client size is a major determinant in the amount of revenue 
that can be generated from non-audit, and audit, services. The y-axis is the coefficient values from the quantile 
regressions. The x-axis is GAAPETR (CASHETR) in Panel A (Panel B), lower values represent higher tax avoidance. 
The definitions for GAAPETR, CASHETR, SIZE, and LogAPTS are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
      
 
All Client-year observations in Audit Analytics for the period 2002-2016 
 
      189,936  
 
Less:  Non-U.S. domiciled clients 
 
      (24,389) 
 
Less: Restatement observations  
 
        (14,474) 
 
Less: Mutual funds, trusts, limited partnerships and other flow-through 
entities  
 
        (60,086) 
Equals: Client-years matched with Compustat 
 
    90,987 
 
Less: Client-years without sufficient data to compute variables  
 
        (36,243) 
 
Less: Client-years with zero or negative pre-tax income (PI ≤ 0) (26,735) 
 
Less: Client-years that did not purchase auditor-provided tax services 
 
(7,586) 
Final Sample of Client-year observations          20,423    
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
(n = 20,423) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. 50th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 
Fees Paid      
APTS($M) 0.3870 0.7340 0.0360 0.1175 0.3671 
LogAPTS 0.2505 0.3418 0.0354 0.1111 0.3127 
Audit_Fees($M) 2.3164 3.4250 0.4410 1.1330 2.5720 
LogAuditFees 0.9060 0.6872 0.3653 0.7575 1.2731 
      
Tax Avoidance      
GAAPETR 0.2868 0.1634 0.2065 0.3148 0.3706 
CASHETR 0.2284 0.1914 0.0755 0.2138 0.3254 
      
Control Variables      
SIZE 6.6469 2.1089 5.3826 6.7796 8.0327 
FI 0.0204 0.0378 0.0000 0.0000 0.0276 
LEV 0.1766 0.1800 0.0039 0.1390 0.2828 
PPE 0.2768 0.2616 0.0798 0.1879 0.3931 
R&D 0.0284 0.0523 0.0000 0.0000 0.0327 
DEP 0.0423 0.0286 0.0237 0.0365 0.0536 
BTM 0.5151 0.3870 0.2671 0.4436 0.6770 
EQINC 0.0013 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PT_ROA 0.1147 0.0996 0.0473 0.0887 0.1514 
NOL 0.4819 0.4997 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ΔNOL 0.0004 0.0791 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
CASH 0.1945 0.2178 0.0364 0.1141 0.2741 
ABACC 0.0137 0.1377 -0.0533 0.0037 0.0619 
      
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for GAAPETR and 
CASHETR, which are winsorized to range between 0 and 1. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) GAAPETR  0.3380 -0.0705 0.0121 -0.0967 -0.0146 0.0343 -0.1945 0.0098 0.0330 -0.0085 
(2) CASHETR 0.3504  -0.0024 0.0225 -0.0032 -0.0855 -0.1132 -0.1060 -0.0450 0.0383 -0.0103 
(3) LogAPTS -0.0969 0.0406  0.5097 0.2206 0.1547 -0.0489 -0.0204 -0.0552 -0.1256 0.1152 
(4) SIZE -0.0453 0.0728 0.5435  0.2677 0.1906 0.0907 -0.0608 -0.0312 -0.3062 0.1216 
(5) FI -0.1928 0.0546 0.3073 0.3090  -0.0590 -0.0765 0.1741 -0.0035 -0.1570 0.0622 
(6) LEV -0.0269 -0.0864 0.2307 0.2678 0.0070  0.3148 -0.2542 0.1116 -0.1328 0.0393 
(7) PPE 0.0602 -0.0780 0.0096 0.1078 -0.0752 0.3392  -0.2712 0.5244 0.0246 0.0633 
(8) R&D -0.2584 -0.0837 0.0769 -0.0088 0.2934 -0.2623 -0.2489  -0.0015 -0.1635 -0.0685 
(9) DEP 0.0172 -0.0385 0.0003 0.0037 0.0071 0.1375 0.6139 0.0075  -0.1062 -0.0201 
(10) BTM 0.0363 -0.0002 -0.1332 -0.3053 -0.1435 -0.0618 0.0070 -0.1890 -0.1206  -0.0133 
(11) EQINC -0.0396 -0.0098 0.1480 0.2090 0.0909 0.1556 0.1132 -0.0812 -0.0150 0.0041  
(12) PT_ROA 0.2010 0.1379 -0.0187 0.1013 0.1295 -0.2496 0.0059 0.0759 0.0783 -0.4489 -0.0104 
(13) NOL -0.1547 -0.01054 0.1000 0.0944 0.1955 0.0736 -0.0971 0.1501 0.0293 -0.0459 0.0024 
(14) ΔNOL -0.0082 -0.0615 -0.0673 -0.0734 -0.0296 -0.0712 -0.0576 0.0315 -0.0283 -0.0151 -0.0205 
(15) CASH -0.1032 -0.0039 -0.0630 -0.0920 0.1379 -0.5141 -0.3599 0.4049 -0.1033 -0.1975 -0.1351 
(16) ABACC -0.0845 -0.0389 -0.0618 -0.1048 -0.0369 0.0504 0.0514 -0.0583 -0.0320 0.1080 0.0316 
             
             
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3 – Correlation Matrix (continued) 
  
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)  
       
(1) GAAPETR 0.0970 -0.1051 -0.0238 -0.0969 -0.1105  
       
(2) CASHETR 0.0182 -0.0879 -0.0349 -0.0550 -0.0424  
       
(3) LogAPTS -0.0585 0.0718 -0.0316 -0.1217 -0.0436  
       
(4) SIZE 0.0323 0.0848 -0.0715 -0.1200 -0.1264  
       
(5) FI 0.1967 0.1445 -0.0347 0.1214 -0.0316  
       
(6) LEV -0.2141 0.0677 -0.0601 -0.3816 0.0340  
       
(7) PPE -0.0234 -0.1102 -0.0479 -0.3167 0.0629  
       
(8) R&D 0.0907 0.1207 0.0398 0.4828 0.0063  
       
(9) DEP 0.0883 0.0180 -0.0312 -0.0994 0.0031  
       
(10) BTM -0.3483 -0.0442 0.0132 -0.1638 0.0626  
       
(11) EQINC 0.0558 -0.0190 -0.0076 -0.0706 0.0327  
       
(12) PT_ROA  -0.0973 0.0844 0.3275 -0.0082  
       
(13) NOL -0.0887  -0.0503 0.0262 0.0357  
       
(14) ΔNOL 0.0637 -0.0393  0.0558 0.0248  
       
(15) CASH 0.2668 0.0602 0.0504  -0.0509  
       
(16) ABACC -0.0815 0.0262 0.0006 -0.1055   
       
        
       
 
              
This table reports correlations between variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are in the upper (lower) diagonal. Bold indicates statistical significance at less than 0.05 level (two-
tailed). See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Quantile Regression of Auditor-Provided Tax Services on Tax Avoidance 
Panel A (GAAPETR) 
Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)   
Estimated Coefficient by Quantile Level with 95% CL 
       
90th -0.0344 *** 0.0033   
85th -0.0365 *** 0.0018   
80th -0.0388 *** 0.0015   
75th -0.0435 *** 0.0015   
70th -0.0501 *** 0.0018   
65th -0.0531 *** 0.0020   
60th -0.0569 *** 0.0021   
55th -0.0605 *** 0.0023   
50th -0.0612 *** 0.0027   
45th -0.0600 *** 0.0030   
40th -0.0585 *** 0.0035   
35th -0.0516 *** 0.0042   Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)  
30th -0.0437 *** 0.0050   23rd -0.0137 * 0.0074  
25th -0.0258 *** 0.0066   22nd -0.0090  0.0078  
20th 0.0047  0.0087   21st -0.0019  0.0082  
15th 0.0416 *** 0.0104   20th 0.0047  0.0086  
10th 0.0570 *** 0.0066   19th 0.0111  0.0086  
      18th 0.0185 ** 0.0092  
      17th 0.0270 *** 0.0096  
 
          
This table presents results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance (GAAPETR) on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). We calculate 
standard errors that are clustered by clients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. We base 
statistical significance on two-sided p-values. Variables are defined in Appendix A. LogAPTS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and GAAPETR is 
winsorized to range between 0 and 1. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Quantile Regression of Auditor-Provided Tax Services on Tax Avoidance 
Panel B (CASHETR) 
Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)   
Estimated Coefficient by Quantile Level with 95% CL 
       
90th -0.0547 *** 0.0087   
85th -0.0466 *** 0.0055   
80th -0.0425 *** 0.0046   
75th -0.0374 *** 0.0041   
70th -0.0297 *** 0.0040   
65th -0.0228 *** 0.0043   
60th -0.0169 *** 0.0044   
55th -0.0089 * 0.0046   
50th 0.0002  0.0050   
45th 0.0111 ** 0.0052   
40th 0.0247 *** 0.0052   
35th 0.0425 *** 0.0054   Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)  
30th 0.0564 *** 0.0053   55th -0.0089 * 0.0046  
25th 0.0636 *** 0.0047   53rd -0.0044  0.0047  
20th 0.0645 *** 0.0036   51st -0.0016  0.0049  
15th 0.0571 *** 0.0026   49th 0.0031  0.0051  
10th 0.0396 *** 0.0013   47th 0.0060  0.0051  
      45th 0.0111 ** 0.0052  
      43rd 0.0175 *** 0.0053  
 
          
This table presents results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance, CASHETR, on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). We calculate 
standard errors that are clustered by clients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. We base 
statistical significance on two-sided p-values. Variables are defined in Appendix A. LogAPTS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and CASHETR is 
winsorized to range between 0 and 1. 
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Table 5 
Multivariate Regression of the Determinants of Tax Avoidance  
 (1)                           (2) (3)                           (4) 
Variable 
GAAPETR 
Coefficient  
(Std. errors) 
CashETR 
Coefficient  
(Std. errors) 
GAAPETR 
Coefficient  
(Std. errors) 
CashETR 
Coefficient  
(Std. errors) 
     
LogAPTS   -0.0380*** -0.0119** 
   (0.0050) (0.0060) 
SIZE 0.0021* 0.0034*** 0.0053*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
FI -0.3378*** 0.0323 -0.3082*** 0.0416 
 (0.0507) (0.0608) (0.0513) (0.0613) 
LEV -0.0321*** -0.0811*** -0.0276** -0.0797*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0128) (0.0112) (0.0129) 
PPE -0.0085 -0.1139*** -0.0151 -0.1160*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0136) 
R&D -0.3886*** -0.3466*** -0.3901*** -0.3471*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0485) (0.0431) (0.0486) 
DEP -0.1395* 0.3237*** -0.1264 0.3278*** 
 (0.0818) (0.0919) (0.0812) (0.0919) 
BTM 0.0172*** 0.0127** 0.0188*** 0.0131** 
 (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0064) 
EQINC -0.8518** -0.5591 -0.7386** -0.5237 
 (0.3491) (0.3854) (0.3480) (0.3849) 
PT_ROA 0.2406*** 0.0091 0.2333*** 0.0068 
 (0.0203) (0.0217) (0.0204) (0.0217) 
NOL -0.0182*** -0.0394*** -0.0183*** -0.0395*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038) 
ΔNOL -0.0594*** -0.1069*** -0.0569*** -0.1061*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0181) (0.0208) (0.0181) 
CASH -0.0645*** -0.0635*** -0.0680*** -0.0646*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0110) (0.0095) (0.0110) 
ABACC -0.1338*** -0.0412*** -0.1310*** -0.0403*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Constant 0.3101*** 0.2737*** 0.2961*** 0.2693*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0179) (0.0141) (0.0181) 
     
Observations 20,423 20,423 20,423 20,423 
Adjusted R2  0.1121 0.0926 0.1162 0.0928 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Columns (1) and (2) present the results from OLS regressions of the determinants of tax avoidance that are 
correlated with auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). The residuals from columns (1) and (2), i.e., the 
variation in ETRs not explained by these determinants, are used as the dependent variables in quantile 
regression tests of H1. Columns (3) and (4) includes LogAPTS as a determinant and shows the mean effect of 
LogAPTS on tax avoidance. Standard errors are clustered by clients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. We base statistical significance on two-
sided p-values. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles.  
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Table 6 
Quantile Regression of the Residual of Tax Avoidance on Auditor-Provided Tax Services 
Panel A (Residual of GAAPETR) 
Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)   
Estimated Coefficient by Quantile Level with 95% CL 
       
90th -0.0462 *** 0.0040   
85th -0.0408 *** 0.0019   
80th -0.0355 *** 0.0018   
75th -0.0334 *** 0.0020   
70th -0.0319 *** 0.0020   
65th -0.0329 *** 0.0019   
60th -0.0311 *** 0.0017   
55th -0.0314 *** 0.0019   
50th -0.0300 *** 0.0019   
45th -0.0295 *** 0.0022   
40th -0.0303 *** 0.0025   
35th -0.0303 *** 0.0029   Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)  
30th -0.0247 *** 0.0027   23rd -0.0119 *** 0.0036  
25th -0.0160 *** 0.0033   22nd -0.0090 ** 0.0040  
20th -0.0031  0.0037   21st -0.0063 * 0.0037  
15th 0.0221 *** 0.0053   20th -0.0031  0.0037  
10th 0.0318 *** 0.0065   19th 0.0005  0.0043  
      18th 0.0063 * 0.0037  
      17th 0.0097 *** 0.0033  
 
          
This table presents results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). The dependent variable is the 
residual estimates from equation (2), which controls for other determinants of tax avoidance. We calculate standard errors clustered by clients. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at less than the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We base statistical significance on two-sided p-values. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. LogAPTS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and GAAPETR is winsorized to range between 0 and 1. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Quantile Regression of the Residual of Tax Avoidance on Auditor-Provided Tax Services 
Panel B (Residual of CASHETR) 
Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)   
Estimated Coefficient by Quantile Level with 95% CL 
      
 
90th -0.0663 *** 0.0059   
85th -0.0449 *** 0.0040   
80th -0.0362 *** 0.0035   
75th -0.0267 *** 0.0031   
70th -0.0228 *** 0.0032   
65th -0.0184 *** 0.0028   
60th -0.0135 *** 0.0029   
55th -0.0086 *** 0.0030   
50th -0.0013  0.0029   
45th 0.0068 ** 0.0030   
40th 0.0137 *** 0.0033   
35th 0.0214 *** 0.0032   Percentile Coefficient  (Std. Error)  
30th 0.0241 *** 0.0036   55
th -0.0086 *** 0.0030  
25th 0.0258 *** 0.0030   53rd -0.0057 * 0.0029  
20th 0.0281 *** 0.0033   51st -0.0013  0.0029  
15th 0.0315 *** 0.0030   49th -0.0002  0.0029  
10th 0.0333 *** 0.0031   47th 0.0024  0.0027  
      45th 0.0068 ** 0.0030  
      43rd 0.0108 *** 0.0030  
 
          
This table presents results from quantile regressions of tax avoidance on fees paid for auditor-provided tax services (LogAPTS). The dependent variable is the 
residual estimates from equation (2), which controls for client-specific determinants of tax avoidance. We calculate standard errors clustered by clients. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We base statistical significance on two-sided p-values. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. LogAPTS is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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